On Monday, the AP revealed the Obama administration and its EU partners are allowing Iran to receive uranium enough for 10 nukes – 116 metric tons. It can be used as the core of an atom bomb.
Iran will receive the uranium from Russia in exchange for heavy water they’ve forwarded to them.
Iran overproduces heavy water, in violation of the nuclear deal, then the Obama administration buys the excess. The US secretly paid Iran $8.6 million for heavy water and in addition, Monday, the AP revealed the swap of heavy water for uranium.
Iran is profiting from violating the nuclear deal. The nuclear deal now serves to let Iran blackmail the US on non-nuclear issues by threatening to collapse the deal and pocket the uranium.
Proponents of the deal say the US can’t act against Iran’s terrorism, ICBMs, and other outrages. The reason, they say, is because the deal is front-loaded and the US only benefits from long-time Iranian compliance. Therefore, if the deal collapses now, non-nuclear pressure could cause the deal to collapse.
As a result the Iranians got enough uranium last year to make almost ten nuclear bombs and enough uranium this year to make ten nuclear bombs.
When the nuclear deal ends, Iran is free to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.
Obama admitted to NPR the deal enables Iran to shrink the breakout time “almost down to zero” thirteen years after implementation, twelve years from now.
Spokesperson Kirby, serpentine Kirby, responded saying that during the term of the deal, Iran’s uranium will be monitored. That doesn’t answer the key questions of Iran profiting from the deal and leveraging the deal to keep the US from acting on non-nuclear issues.
MR KIRBY: Well, again, they’re allowed to bring in natural uranium. I would let – I can’t – sorry, there’s – I cannot confirm these reports…
QUESTION: Well, is it not correct, though, that after – or tell me, I mean, if they hold onto this, if they store it away for 25 years, can they then not take this 116 tons and then do whatever they want with it?
MR KIRBY: Well, the – first of all, I really hate – I hate hypotheticals —
QUESTION: Or whatever the quantity —
MR KIRBY: — particularly the ones that go out two and a half decades from now, but —
QUESTION: Look, the – your whole point is that don’t worry, this is going to be subject to inspection and verification —
QUESTION: So after those limitations expire, is it not correct that they could do whatever they want with it?
MR KIRBY: I’m not going to speculate one way or another here about something that –may or may not happen 25 years from now, Matt. There’s a strong inspection regime in place —
MR KIRBY: — to prevent Iran from ever being able to achieve a nuclear weapon, and that’s on page – by the way, not 25 years. The deal says Iran will never achieve nuclear weapons capability, but let’s get beyond that. I’m not going to speculate about what might or might not happen 25 years from now.
MR KIRBY: I just don’t think that’s a useful exercise.
QUESTION: Well, it may not be a useful exercise for you, but I mean, if you’re looking at this from the perspective of other countries in the region – Gulf, Arab countries – I mean, 25 years isn’t that long, is it not?
MR KIRBY: Well, for you and me, it might —
MR KIRBY: Matt, I do understand where the question’s going. There’s no prohibition under the deal now for them to bring this material in in its natural form. It cannot be enriched – it cannot be used, I’m sorry, for a weapon.”
“There is a very strong inspection regime in place for a very long time. And oh, by the way, in the deal, Iran said they would never achieve nuclear weapons capability.” [Oh, that makes it better]
“So I can’t – I don’t think either of us can predict what things are going to look like 20 years from now or 25 years from now or what the inspection regime continues to find and continues to be able to see 25 years from now. But we’re confident that the deal makes the region safer, makes our allies and partners safer, will prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability. And I think that’s probably the best place to leave it.”
Crosstalk with Kirby asking that reporter if he’s going to ask the same question.
QUESTION: Yes, on the same thing, yeah. So they’re permitted to bring in natural uranium, as you say, but the Associated Press story that Matt referenced seemed to suggest that this particular batch was – has been permitted by some kind of decision. Now, without confirming that, as you say you can’t —
MR KIRBY: Right.
QUESTION: — do they have to inform their partners in the JCPOA when they do bring in natural uranium?
MR KIRBY: I’m not – I’m going to have to take the question. I don’t know. As – and again, I want to be clear: I cannot confirm the press reporting on this and I’m not going to speak about the working group’s – anything that would violate the working group’s confidentiality. But as a matter of procedure, I’d have to ask. I don’t know. Okay?
There you have it, Iran can blackmail the US into allowing them to receive cash and uranium they can use for terrorism and stockpiling respectively. In twelve years, their breakout time will be zero, in other words, they will have the bomb locked and loaded. They continue to build ICBMs to be used as nuclear weapons.
Kirby doesn’t want to “speculate” what Iran might do with uranium enough for 10 nukes.